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Abstract Recently, Sun et al. [Quant Inf Proc DOI: 10.1007/s11128-013-0569-
x] presented an efficient multi-party quantum key agreement (QKA) protocol by
employing single particles and unitary operations. The aim of this protocol is to
fairly and securely negotiate a secret session key among N parties with a high
qubit efficiency. In addition, the authors claimed that no participant can learn
anything more than his/her prescribed output in this protocol, i.e., the sub-secret
keys of the participants can be kept secret during the protocol. However, here
we points out that the sub-secret of a participant in Sun et al.’s protocol can
be eavesdropped by the two participants next to him/her. In addition, a certain
number of dishonest participants can fully determine the final shared key in this
protocol. Finally, we discuss the factors that should be considered when designing
a really fair and secure QKA protocol.
Keywords Quantum cryptography · Quantum key agreement · Cryptanalysis
1 Introduction
Key agreement (KA) is one of the most basic cryptographic primitives which
allows two or more participants to establish a common secret key fairly based on
their exchanged information. In contrast to key distribution (KD), in which only
one participant determine the secret key and then distributes it to the others, each
participant in a KA protocol should contribute his/her influence to the shared key.
In other words, the shared key cannot be determined by any non-trivial subset of
the participants involved in a QKA protocol. In 1976, Diffe and Hellman [1] first
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introduced a secure and fair protocol for two parties to agree on a shared key.
Since the pioneering work of Diffe and Hellman, much attention has been focused
on extending the two-party Diffie-Hellman protocol to the multi-party setting, and
a number of correlated protocols have been proposed [2,3,4].
However, the security of the classical KA protocols is always based on the
assumption of computational complexity. Along with the proposing of efficient al-
gorithms and the development of the computing capability, especially the rapid
development of quantum algorithms and quantum computer [5,6], classical KA
agreement protocols faces more and more serious challenges. Therefore, the devel-
opment of quantum key agreement (QKA) protocols [7,8,9,10,11,12], whose se-
curity only relies on the laws of quantum mechanics (such as quantum no-cloning
theorem and Heisenberg uncertainty principle), has become a research hotspot.
In 2004, Zhou et al. presented the first QKA protocol with quantum teleporta-
tion technique and maximally entangled states over public channels [7]. However,
Tsai and Hwang pointed out that a party in this protocol can fully determine the
shared key alone without being detected [7]. Hence Zhou et al.’s protocol is not a
fair QKA protocol. In 2011, Chong et al. presented a QKA protocol based on the
famous BB84 protocol in which the technique of delayed measurement and certain
kinds of unitary operations are utilized [9]. In 2012, an extension of the two-party
quantum key agreement, the first multi-party quantum key agreement (MQKA)
protocol, was proposed by Shi and Zhong by employing EPR pairs and entangle-
ment swapping [10]. Unfortunately, Liu et al. pointed out that their protocol was
not fair as a dishonest participant can totally determine the shared key, and they
also presented a secure multi-party QKA protocol only with single particles and
single-particle measurements.
It is known that design and cryptanalysis have always been important branches
of cryptography. Both of them drive the development of this field. In fact, crypt-
analysis is an important and interesting work in quantum cryptography. It esti-
mates the security level of a protocol, finds potential loopholes, and tries to over-
come security issues [13]. As pointed out by Lo and Ko, breaking cryptographic
systems was as important as building them[14]. To date, many kinds of attacks
strategies have been presented, such as intercept-resend attack [15], correlation-
extractability (CE) attack [16,17], Trojan horse attack [18], participant attack [19,
20,21] and so on.
Recently, Sun et al. [12] pointed out that the qubit efficiency of Liu et al.’s
MQKA protocol (i.e., 1(k+1)N(N−1) ) is quite low. To improve the qubit efficiency
of the MQKA protocol, they proposed a more efficient one with single particles and
unitary operations, the qubit efficiency of which reaches 1(k+1)N . For the sake of
simplicity, we will call it SMQKA protocol later. The authors of Ref. [12] claimed
that the SMQKA protocol satisfies the following four principles.
• Correctness: Each of the participants involved in this protocol could get the
correct shared key.
• Security: An outside eavesdropper can get no useful information of the shared
key without being detected in the eavesdropping detection.
• Fairness: All involved participants are entirely peer entities and can equally
influence the final shared key. In other words, no non-trivial subset of the
participants can determine the shared key.
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• Privacy: No participant can learn anything more than his/her prescribed out-
put in this protocol, i.e., the sub-secret keys of the participants can be kept
secret in this protocol.
Unfortunately, we find that the SMQKA protocol cannot achieve privacy and
fairness, which indicates that this protocol cannot reach the high efficiency fairly
and secretly as Sun et al. claimed. Concretely, the sub-secret of a participant in
this protocol can be easily deduced by the two participants next to him/her. More
importantly, a certain number of dishonest participants can cooperate to decide
the final shared key according to their needs, without being found by the honest
participants. The rest of this paper is arranged as follows. In next section, we make
a brief introduction of the SMQKA protocol. In Sect. 3, we make an analysis of
the SMQKA protocol to show that this protocol can achieve neither privacy nor
fairness in detail. Finally, a discussion about the factors that should be considered
when designing a really fair and secure QKA protocol, as well as a short conclusion
is given in Sect. 4.
2 Brief review of the SMQKA protocol
Herein we briefly describe the SMQKA protocol [12] in which N participants are
involved. Each participant Pi has a sub-secret key ki, for 0≤i≤N -1. None of them is
willing to divulge any information of his/her sub-secret key to others. This protocol
is designed in the travelling mode, which indicates that Pi always sends messages
to Pi+1, where PN=P0. The specific steps of this protocol can be described as
follows.
(1) Initialization phase. For each participant Pi, he/she prepares a sequence (de-
noted as Si) of n single particles, each of which is randomly in one of the two
polarization states: |0〉 and |1〉. Then he/she generates kn decoy particles which
are randomly in one of the four states in {|+〉, |−〉, |+ y〉, | − y〉} and inserts
them randomly into the sequence Si, where
|+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉),
|+ y〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ i|1〉), | − y〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − i|1〉). (1)
Here k is the detection rate and the new sequence is denoted as Sii . After that,
Pi sends the sequence S
i
i to Pi+1.
(2) Eavesdropping detection phase. After the reception of Sii , Pi+1 begins to check
eavesdropping with Pi as follows. Pi announces the position and the corre-
sponding measuring basis for each of the decoy particles. Then Pi+1 measures
it with the correct basis and inform Pi of the measurement outcome. With the
measurement outcomes of all the decoy particles, Pi analyzes the security of the
transmission of Sii . If the error rate is higher than a predetermined threshold,
they abort the protocol; otherwise, they continue to the next step.
(3) The message coding phase. Once the eavesdropping detection is finished, Pi+1
encodes each of the particles in Si with unitary operation I or U according to
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his/her sub-secret ki+1. Specifically, if a bit in ki+1 is 0 (1), he performs the
operation I (U) on the corresponding particle in Si, where
I = |0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|, U = iσy = |0〉〈1| − |1〉〈0|. (2)
Before sending Si to the next participant, Pi+1 also makes use of kn decoy
particles to ensure the secure transmission of Si, similar to what Pi does in
step (2). Afterwards, Pi+1 sends the new sequence ( denoted as S
i+1
i ) to Pi+2.
(4) The participants Pi+2, ..., Pi−2 execute the eavesdropping detection phase and
message coding phase in the same way as participant Pi+1 does in steps (2)-
(3) one by one. That is, one after another, they first check eavesdropping, if
the transmission is insecure, the aborts the protocol; otherwise, they encode
their sub-secret keys on the particles of Si, and then inserts decoy particles
randomly in Si. Finally, they send the new sequence to the next participant.
(5) After Pi−1 receives the sequence S
i−2
i sent from Pi−2, they first checks eaves-
dropping with the inserted decoy particles. If there exists no eavesdropping,
Pi−1 encodes his/her sub-secret key ki−1 on the particles of Si, and inserts the
kn decoy particles randomly in it, denoted as Si−1i ; otherwise, they discard the
transmission and abort the protocol.
(6) Once confirming that each of the participants P0, ..., Pi, ..., PN−1 has executed
the steps (1)-(5), PN−1, ..., Pi−1, ..., PN−2 send sequences S
N−1
0 , ..., S
i−1
i , ...,
SN−2N−1 to P0, ..., Pi, ..., PN−1, respectively.
(7) After Pi receives the sequence S
i−1
i sent from Pi−1, he/she and Pi−1 check
eavesdropping with the decoy particles. If there exists eavesdropping in the
quantum channel, they abandon the protocol; otherwise, Pi measures each
of the particles in Si with the basis {|0〉, |1〉}. Since Si is prepared by Pi,
he/she knows the original state of each particle in Si, hence he/she can extract
the encoded secret Ki−1i =ki+1⊕ki+2⊕· · ·⊕ki−1. Finally, Pi obtains the final
shared key K=ki⊕Ki−1i =k0⊕k1⊕· · ·⊕kN−1, where i=0, 1, ..., N -1.
3 Analysis of the SMQKA Protocol
In this section, we first show that the SMQKA Protocol cannot achieve the prin-
ciple of privacy. Then we illustrate that this protocol cannot achieve the principle
of fairness, either.
3.1 The defect on privacy
Herein we show that the sub-secret key of any involved participant in the SMQKA
protocol can be obtained by the two participants next to him/her. Without loss
of generality, we consider the situation where Pi−1 and Pi+1 try to steal the
sub-secret key of Pi (i.e., ki), for 0≤i≤N -1. To eavesdrop ki, Pi−1 prepares the
sequence Si−1 of n single particles which are all in state |0〉. Then he/she gener-
ates kn decoy particles which are randomly in one of the four states in {|+〉, |−〉,
| + y〉, | − y〉} and inserts them randomly into Si−1. After that, Pi−1 sends the
new sequence (denoted as Si−1i−1) to Pi. Once Pi receives the sequence S
i−1
i−1 , he/she
and Pi−1 check eavesdropping with the decoy particles. Since the decoy particles
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in Si−1i−1 are prepared and inserted by Pi−1, Pi will find no abnormal occurrence if
there quantum channel is secure. Once they confirm there exists no eavesdropping
in the transmission of Si−1i−1 , Pi encodes his sub-secret key ki on Si−1 as described
in step (3). Afterwards, Pi also randomly inserts kn decoy particles into Si−1 and
sends the new sequence (denoted as Sii−1) to Pi+1. Then Pi and Pi+1 check eaves-
dropping with the decoy particles inserted by Pi. If there exists no eavesdropping
in the quantum channel, Pi+1 can easily deduce ki as follows. Concretely, he/she
measures each of the particles in Si−1 with the measuring basis {|0〉, |1〉}. If the
measurement outcome is |0〉 (|1〉), the corresponding key bit in ki is 0 (1). So far,
we have shown that Pi−1 and Pi+1 can easily eavesdrop the sub-secret key of Pi,
for 0≤i≤N -1. In other words, the SMQKA Protocol cannot achieve the principle
of privacy.
3.2 The defect on privacy
Now we illustrate that a certain number of dishonest participants can determine
the final shared key according to their needs. First, we consider the special cir-
cumstance in which N -1 dishonest participants try to determine the final shared
key. Without loss of generality, we suppose that the N -1 dishonest ones are P0, P1,
..., PN−2. To determine the final shared key, P0, P1, ..., PN−2 pretend to execute
the protocol honestly. Specifically, P0, P1, ..., PN−3 do nothing on SN−1, which
is prepared by PN−1. Meanwhile, by utilizing the attacking strategy introduced
in the previous sub-section, PN−2 and P0 steal the sub-secret key of PN−1, i.e.,
kN−1. Once the dishonest participants obtain kN−1, they can fully control the
final shared key as follow. If their favorite shared key is k′, when PN−2 has se-
curely received SN−1, he encodes the particles of it with k
′⊕kN−1. Concretely, if
the j-th bit of k′⊕kN−1 is 0 (1), he/she performs the unitary operation I (U) on
the corresponding particle in SN−1, for 0≤j≤n. After that, PN−2 inserts kn decoy
particles in SN−1 and sends S
N−2
N−1 to PN−1. If the transmission of S
N−2
N−1 is secure,
the final shared key obtained by PN−1 is k
′⊕kN−1⊕kN−1=k′. In other words, the
N -1 dishonest participants have successfully determined the final shared key.
Now we wonder that whether the dishonest participants can determine the
final shared key when there exists more than one honest participants. In fact,
if the honest participants are nonadjacent, the dishonest participants can fully
control the final shared key in the SMQKA protocol. Without loss of generality,
we assume that the honest participants are Ph1 , Ph2 , ..., Phs , where hi, hj∈{1,
..., N -1}, hi 6=hj±1. Since the honest participants are nonadjacent, the number
of them should be less than half of N , i.e., s≤N2 (N2 -1) if N is even (odd). To
control the final shared key, the dishonest participants also pretend to execute
the protocol honestly. During the execution of this protocol, they preserve the
sequences prepared by the honest ones, i.e., Sh1 , Sh2 , ..., Shs . At the same time,
by employing the attacking strategy presented above, the dishonest participants
steal the sub-secret keys of the honest participants, i.e., kh1 , kh2 ,..., khs . Suppose
their favorite key is k′′, they can control the final shared key as follows. For Phi ,
Phi−1 encodes Shi with k
′′⊕khi , for i=h1, h2, ..., hs. Afterwards, Phi−1 sends Shi
together with kn decoy particles to Phi . If there exists no outside eavesdropping,
the final shared key obtained by Phi is k
′′⊕khi⊕khi=k′′. Thus far, we have shown
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that the dishonest participants can fully determine the final shared key in this
protocol provided the honest participants are nonadjacent.
4 Discussion and conclusions
4.1 Discussion
In a real practical quantum key establishing process, including both QKD and
QKA, there are two main processes. Here we call these two processes as quantum
exchange process and classical postprocessing process, respectively. In the quan-
tum exchange process, the participants make use of quantum states as information
carriers to guarantee the security the information transmission based on the princi-
ples of quantum mechanics. After this process, the participants can get a sequence
of classical string which is usually called raw key. However, due to the noise of the
quantum channel and eavesdropping, there always exists certain number of errors
in the raw key. In QKD protocols, these errors are usually corrected and cleaned
by classical postprocessing process which usually consists of two processes: the
information reconciliation process and the privacy amplification process [22,23].
However, all the existing information reconciliation processes and privacy am-
plification processes utilized in QKD protocols cannot be directly applied to the
QKA protocols, since the dishonest participants may undermine the fairness of
the shared key during these two processes. Thus far, all the existing QKA proto-
cols [7,8,9,10,11,12] only have concerned the quantum exchange process. In other
words, the final shared key established by these protocols are just raw key, which
cannot be used to encrypt secret message directly in real life. Obviously, to design
a really practical and fair QKA protocol, one should not only consider the fairness
in the quantum exchange process, but also present new information reconciliation
process and privacy amplification process which can be utilized in QKA protocols
for negotiating key fairly. Therefore, how to design the a really unconditional fair
and secure QKA protocol, which involves both the quantum exchange process and
classical postprocessing process, still remains an open problem. Some of us are
currently investigating this problem and the relevant results will be published in
another paper.
4.2 Conclusion
In summary, we make an analysis of the MQKA protocol which have been pre-
sented recently [12] and point out that this protocol can achieve neither privacy
nor fairness as the authors claimed. Moreover, we make a discussion about the
factors that should be taken into consideration when designing a really fair and
secure QKA protocol.
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